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2.1 Introduction
Antitrust policy is one branch of public policy that may be used to limit
the market power of deregulated and privatized public utilities. The expe-
rience over the last two decades or so of the telecommunications and air-
lines industries in the United States and of many of the deregulated util-
ities in the United Kingdom is that the opening to competition of
monopolies that were previously protected by statute or regulation led ini-
tially to entry; but, after a period of a few years, there were strong incen-
tives for these new enterprises to merge. This experience suggests that
countries contemplating privatization and deregulation of public utilities
should consider whether their antitrust regimes (and, in particular, their
merger policies) are appropriate to the period of privatization and deregu-
lation.
The current provisions of Australia’s antitrust merger regime have re-
mained virtually unchanged since 1974. Australia’s experience with these
provisions in the subsequent quarter of a century yields some useful lessons
for countries that are contemplating the introduction, or reform, of their
antitrust policies in preparation of greater reliance on market constraints
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tions to the international stock of regulatory design, whereas other fea-
tures of the Australian regime are best not replicated.
Any assessment of public policy must ultimately depend on the social
welfare function that one adopts. This paper will adopt as a deﬁnition of
value the diﬀerence between willingness to pay and opportunity cost; and
anything that enhances value will be regarded as good. Like much eco-
nomic activity, mergers are undertaken because they enhance the value
that accrues to the parties to the merger. But value may accrue to a person
either because more value has been created or because he or she is able to
gain a larger share of the value that exists. It is common to label behavior
that creates value as eﬃcient, and to label behavior that merely enhances
bargaining power as monopolization or rent seeking.1 If we adopt the value
standard in assessing public policy, monopoly is neither uniformly good
nor uniformly bad. Nevertheless, antitrust policy carries a general pre-
sumption against monopoly because one classic way in which a monopo-
list increases its bargaining power with respect to its customers is by limit-
ing the amount of output it is prepared to supply. That is, the monopolist
deliberately destroys value in order to increase its bargaining power with
respect to its customers. This paper accepts this presumption. It accepts
that a public policy motivated by the maximization of value will seek to
prevent mergers that enhance monopoly power because, in general, the en-
hancement of monopoly power will diminish value.
Mergers and takeovers involve the sale of assets. Like other forms of
trade, mergers occur because the buyer’s willingness to pay for the assets
exceeds the seller’s opportunity cost of the sale. The gains from trade can
derive from three principal sources: an increase in economic eﬃciency, an
increase in monopoly power, or an increase in the scope for rent seeking
more broadly. The increase in economic eﬃciency can take many forms;
but these generally can be classiﬁed as either identifying assets that the
market has previously undervalued, or taking advantage of some type of
synergy that can better be realized within a merged entity than by means of
trade between the activities of the two enterprises. The increase in monop-
oly power is generally a result of an increase in concentration in a partic-
ular market, which may lead to problems of monopoly either because of
increased likelihood of collusion (see Stigler 1964; Green and Porter 1984)
or because of independent behavior (Cournot 1929; Cowling and Water-
son 1976). In addition to seeking monopoly rents, mergers and acquisi-
tions can be motivated by other forms of rent seeking. For instance, parties
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1. According to Buchanan (1980), economic rent “is that part of the payment to an owner
of resources over and above that which those resources could command in any alternative
use” (3). As monopoly proﬁts are payments above opportunity costs, they are economic rents.
They are not the only form of economic rents, however. For instance, economic rents can be
achieved by those favored by government licences or from favorable government contracts.with close alignments with the government may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to acquire
a ﬁrm whose proﬁts are driven by success in gaining government contracts.
Antitrust merger policy that aims to maximize value should distinguish
between mergers with these motivations. Putting the matter crudely, it
should allow to proceed those mergers that are motivated by economic eﬃ-
ciency and it should disallow those mergers that are motivated by an in-
crease in monopoly power or rent seeking. In practice, a particular merger
can rarely be placed neatly into these boxes. For instance, real-life mergers
have the uncomfortable habit of straddling eﬃciency and monopoly
power—with one foot ﬁrmly in one box and the other foot more or less
ﬁrmly in the other. The task of the regulator or the court is to decide what
is going on. If the merger is clearly all about increasing the monopoly power
of the parties or rent seeking, it should be stopped. If there are clear eﬃ-
ciency advantages or if it is not clear which of the considerations predomi-
nates, the merger should be allowed to proceed on the ground that regula-
tors and courts should place the onus of proof (as a lawyer would put it) on
the party that is advocating interference in the freedom of the market.
This paper will return to the point of onus of proof toward the end. It is
clearly important in the rules and operation of any antitrust policy. It also
biases many judgments within transition economies as to whether antitrust
policy should be adopted. Even if one adopts the standard of value as one’s
standard of public policy, one may still be opposed to antitrust policy on
the ground that the overwhelming majority of all mergers are value en-
hancing. This presumption would have particular appeal in an economy,
such as Hong Kong, where international trade and investment ﬂows are
relatively free. But even in Hong Kong one can readily observe economic
activities, such as rail links and transport tunnels, where monopoly power
might be used to destroy value. It is appropriate to ask how antitrust pol-
icy might be structured so as to enhance the value that is created by indus-
tries such as these. That is the question that is addressed by this paper: If a
nation is contemplating antitrust merger policy, does the experience of
Australia oﬀer any guidance as to how value might be maximized? In draw-
ing on Australia’s experience we primarily focus on the success of Aus-
tralian policy in distinguishing between mergers that enhance eﬃciency
and mergers that enhance monopoly power. Although mergers may be en-
hanced by rent seeking, this is currently not a major driver of mergers or
acquisitions in Australia. We do, however, make some comments at the end
of the paper on how changes in the Australian merger laws could reduce the
incentive for rent seeking.
The distinction between conduct prompted by economic eﬃciency and
conduct prompted by monopoly power is fundamental to antitrust policy.
But merger policy has a very particular set of issues that sets it apart from
other elements of antitrust policy: timeliness and secrecy are most often
crucial for its successful implementation. Timeliness is related to secrecy in
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dential matter, the greater is the danger that information will leak to the
market. The leaking of information may raise the price of the target and
thereby reduce the gains to the bidder (Schwert 1996). If gains to the bid-
der are reduced by the processes of the law, there is a danger that the in-
centives for enterprises to seek out eﬃciency-enhancing mergers will be
reduced. Even in a public process, such as a trial, timeliness is related to
eﬃciency, not via secrecy but through the spread of information. A long
trial may make eﬃciency-enhancing opportunities disappear because the
world changes or because a more attractive bidder may appear, or because
the second most attractive bidder loses interest. To repeat, the danger with
these happenings is not that they discourage mergers that are motivated by
increasing monopoly power. The danger is that delays and consequent
ﬂows of information may discourage enterprises from searching out eﬃ-
ciency-enhancing merger opportunities. This is not to imply that process
must be kept secret once the merger has been made public. To do so runs
the danger of undermining conﬁdence in the decision-making process.
These reﬂections lead us to propose that two criteria are necessary if
antitrust merger policy is to enhance value. In the ﬁrst place, the criteria for
assessing mergers should direct the regulators or the courts to allow those
mergers that promote economic eﬃciency and to disallow those mergers
that promote monopoly power. Second, the process of assessment should
be able to be conducted in a way that maintains conﬁdentiality (until the
merger is made public by the ﬁrms involved) and is speedy.
This paper explains the formal processes of Australian antitrust merger
policy and how it performs against these twin sets of criteria. The experi-
ence over the last quarter of a century is that Australia’s formal, statutory
processes have been quite unsuitable when assessed against these criteria.
The paper explains why the delay and public nature of these processes have
made them quite unsuitable. These problems with the formal, statutory
processes have led to the evolution of a process of conﬁdential, informal
clearance of mergers. This process has no basis in any Australian statute.
Conﬁdential, informal clearance of mergers has satisﬁed the criterion of a
speedy and conﬁdential process, but it has not enabled the proper weigh-
ing of eﬃciency and monopoly. The process of informal clearance of merg-
ers has led, in turn, to two other problems: a lack of formal guidance by
means of precedent, and the assumption by the antitrust regulator of an
unhealthy degree of power to extract concessions from the enterprises that
wish to merge. In brief, Australia’s reliance on discretion over rules has lim-
ited the extent to which its merger policy has been able to enhance the value
generated by the Australian economy.
This criticism applies to antitrust merger policy in other jurisdictions.
Antitrust merger policy in both the United States and Europe has become
an administrative rather than a court-centered process. This has caused
38 Philip L. Williams and Graeme Woodbridgelawyers to raise questions about appropriate processes and the develop-
ment of the law. As noted by Sims and Herman,
[B]ecause . . . most merger objections are resolved by consent decree;
merger litigation (at least outside the hospital industry) has become a
rare beast. Given that consent decree negotiations are private, and con-
ﬁdentiality rules (and sometimes agency prudence) limit what can be dis-
closed about why the agency did what it did, it is increasingly diﬃcult for
those who are not interacting regularly with the agency and other merger
lawyers to be fully informed about how the agencies (and, to an even
greater degree, particularly staﬀers) are approaching speciﬁc types of
problems. (1997, 883)
2.2 Proscribed Behavior
2.2.1 The Wording of Section 50
The principal proscription of mergers in Australia’s antitrust law is to be
found in s. 50 of the Trade Practices Act. Its present wording is (in part) as
follows:
s. 50 Prohibition of acquisitions that would result in a substantial less-
ening of competition
(1) A corporation must not directly or indirectly:
(a) acquire shares in the capital of a body corporate; or
(b) acquire any assets of a person;
if the acquisition would have the eﬀect, or be likely to have the
eﬀect, of substantially lessening competition in a market.
(2) A person must not directly or indirectly:
(a) acquire shares in the capital of a corporation; or
(b) acquire any assets of a corporation;
if the acquisition would have the eﬀect, or be likely to have the
eﬀect, of substantially lessening competition in a market.
(3) Without limiting the matters that may be taken into account
for the purposes of subsections (1) and (2) in determining
whether the acquisition would have the eﬀect, or be likely to
have the eﬀect, of substantially lessening competition in a mar-
ket, the following matters must be taken into account:
(a) the actual and potential level of import competition in the
market;
(b) the height of barriers to entry to the market;
(c)  the level of concentration in the market;
(d)  the degree of countervailing power in the market;
(e)  the likelihood that the acquisition would result in the ac-
quirer being able to signiﬁcantly and sustainably increase
prices or proﬁt margins;
(f) the extent to which substitutes are available in the market
or are likely to be available in the market;
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growth, innovation and product diﬀerentiation;
(h) the likelihood that the acquisition would result in the re-
moval from the market of a vigorous and eﬀective com-
petitor;
(i)  the nature and extent of vertical integration in the market.
The principal mergers that have been dealt with under s. 50 are listed af-
ter the references and summarized in the appendix to this paper. The ap-
pendix summarizes the cases in diagrams that have been constructed sim-
ilar to the trees used in the extended form of game theory for games that
take place over time. The decisions closer to the top of the page occurred
prior to the decisions lower on the page. At any moment, the player who
has to make the decision is confronted with the options that are outlined.
The option that was, in fact, selected is that which is indicated by an arrow.
Some of the cases summarized in the appendix were dealt with under a
version of s. 50 whose criterion diﬀered from that which is quoted above.
The original proscription was similar to the present. The ﬁrst merger that
came before the courts was the attempted acquisition of Avis Rent-a-Car
by Ansett Transport Industries (Ansett Avis). This was tried following the
amendments to the Trade Practices Act in 1977 in which the test of sub-
stantial lessening of competition was amended to that of an acquisition by
a corporation that would be, or would be likely to be, in a position to con-
trol or dominate a market. The trial judge in Ansett Avis considered the
phrase “control or dominate.” He found “that the word ‘dominate’ is to be
construed as something less than ‘control’” (Ansett Avis at 17717) and, be-
cause of this, the word “control” was redundant. It was removed.
The only other three mergers to be tried under the section—Australian
Meat Holdings’ attempt to acquire Thomas Borthwick and Sons (AMH),
the attempt by Arnotts to acquire the biscuit business of Nabisco Australia
(Arnotts), and the attempt by Davids Holdings to take over QIW Retailers
(QIW v. Davids)—were assessed according to the criterion of dominance
of a market.
The present section came into eﬀect on 21 January 1993. Although pro-
ceedings have been issued under the current section, no cases have resulted
in judgment. The reasons for the lack of litigation under the section will be
explored in section 2.2.2 of this paper.
The current (and original) test of substantial lessening of competition
uses words that appear elsewhere in the antitrust provisions of the Trade
Practices Act. This means that we are able to speak conﬁdently of the
meaning of the test without the aid of a decision in a trial under the sec-
tion. The seminal authority for the phrase is to be found in a case under s.
47 involving exclusive dealing: the decision of the full federal court in Out-
board Marine v. Hecar appeal. In that decision, the full federal court held
40 Philip L. Williams and Graeme WoodbridgeFig. 2.1 Ansett AvisFig. 2.2 AMHFig. 2.2 (cont.)Fig. 2.3 ArnottsFig. 2.4 QIW v. Davidsthat the state of competition depended on the structure of the market, so a
substantial lessening of competition involved a change in the structure of
the market. To prove a substantial lessening of competition, one had to
prove that the structure of the market with the conduct in question would
be less conducive to competitive behavior than would be the structure of
the market without the conduct in question. The full court put it in these
words:
More assistance [in deﬁning competition] can be gleaned from the de-
cision of the Trade Practices Tribunal with Woodward J. presiding, in
Re Queensland Co-Operative Milling Association Limited; Re Deﬁance
Holdings Limited (1976) ATPR 40-012; (1976) 8 A.L.R. 481. There an
economic concept of competition was adopted. Five elements of market
structure were noted by the Tribunal as being relevant to the determina-
tion of the state of competition in a market. Of those, the most impor-
tant factor was said to be the height of barriers to entry, that is, the ease
with which new ﬁrms might enter and secure a viable market....  
It would seem that “competition” for the purposes of sec. 47(10) must be
read as referring to a process or state of aﬀairs in the market. In consid-
ering the state of competition a detailed evaluation of the market struc-
ture seems to be required. In the Dandycase Smithers J.regarded as nec-
essary an assessment of the nature and extent of competition which
would exist therein but for the conduct in question, the operation of the
market and the extent of the contemplated lessening.
Two other decisions of the Trade Practices Tribunal are relevant here—
Ford Motor Co. of Australia Limited v. Ford Sales Co. of Australia Lim-
ited (1977) ATPR 40-043; and Southern Cross Beverages Pty. Limited
(1981) ATPR 40-200. In both cases, the Tribunal undertook a detailed
analysis of the market, the state of competition therein and the likely
eﬀect of the conduct upon competition in the market. In our opinion,
the same type of approach should have been adopted in the present case.
(Outboard Marine v. Hecar appeal at 43983).
A further gloss on the notion of substantial lessening of competition has
been the gradual emergence of the future-with-and-without test. The test
makes it clear that the substantial lessening does not involve a comparison
of the future with the past. Rather, it is a forward-looking test. In particu-
lar, it involves a comparison of the future state of competition in the mar-
ket if the merger were to occur with the future state of competition in the
market if the merger were not to occur.
The future-with-and-without test is at least implicit in the tribunal’s
decision of Re QCMA, which has as one of its subheadings “The Future
of Barnes without Merger.” The test has been quite explicitly adopted by
the full court of the federal court in Stirling Harbour Services appeal (at
41267):
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duct has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the eﬀect, of substantially
lessening competition in the relevant market, the Court has to:
• consider the likely state of future competition in the market “with
and without” the impugned conduct; and
• on the basis of such consideration, conclude whether the conduct
has the proscribed purpose or eﬀect
Dandy Power Equipment Pty Limited v Mercury Marine Pty Limited
(1982) ATPR 40-315 at 43,887; (1982) 64 FLR 238 at 259; Outboard Ma-
rine Australia Pty Limited v Hecar Investments No 6 Pty Limited (1982)
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Fig. 2.5 Re QCMAATPR 40-327 at 43,982; (1982) 44 ALR 667 at 669–670. The test is not a
“before and after” test, although, as a matter of fact, the existing state of
competition in the market may throw some light on the likely future state
of competition in the market absent the impugned conduct.
The reference by the tribunal in Re QCMA and by the full federal court
in Outboard Marine v. Hecarto the primacy of the condition of entry in con-
sidering the extent to which a market is competitive gives a clear hint as to
the time horizon over which competition is to be assessed. If one gives pri-
macy to the condition of entry, there is a clear indication that one is assess-
ing competitive forces over a long time horizon. The point is made in Brunt
(1990, 96) as follows:
Competition is a process rather than a situation. Dynamic processes of
substitution are at work. Technological change in products and pro-
cesses, whether small or large, is ongoing and there are changing tastes
and shifting demographic and locational factors to which business ﬁrms
respond. Proﬁts and losses move the system: it is the hope of supernor-
mal proﬁts and some respite from the “perennial gale” that motivates
ﬁrms’ endeavours to discover and supply the kinds of goods and services
their customers want and to strive for cost-eﬃciency. Such a vision tells
us that eﬀective competition is fully compatible with the existence of
strictly “limited monopolies” resting upon some short run advantage or
upon distinctive characteristics of product (including location). Where
there is eﬀective competition, it is the on-going substitution process that
ensures that any achievement of market power will be transitory.
The paucity of litigation under s. 50 has meant that there are many ques-
tions over which the courts have given companies and their legal advisers
little guidance—simply because the issues have not arisen during the
course of litigation. One such area of uncertainty is the relevance of argu-
ments to do with eﬃciency under s. 50. In section 2.1 of this chapter, we ar-
gued that mergers could be motivated either by prospective enhancements
in economic eﬃciency or by prospective increases in monopoly power. The
words of the test as set out in s. 50 make no explicit reference to economic
eﬃciency, so the extent to which argument over economic eﬃciency would
be relevant to a case tried under s. 50 has not been decided.
The issue did arise in the Arnottslitigation. Both the judgment at the trial
and the full court on appeal make the point that there are substantial econ-
omies of scale in the production and distribution of biscuits. The courts
found the point to go to market power; but it could have been interpreted
as an eﬃciency explanation of the merger. The appeal judgment was in no
doubt as to the importance of economies of scale for Arnotts Limited:
Arnotts’ economies of scale ﬂow, of course, from its market share. Once
again, more detail would have been helpful. But it is clear that Arnotts
does enjoy substantial economies of scale. Its volume provides ﬂexibility
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vertising, with emphasis upon the name and tradition of Arnotts. Its
great product range minimises seasonal sales ﬂuctuations, with resulting
beneﬁts to cash ﬂow, the eﬃcient use of manufacturing and distribution
resources and retention of supermarket shelf space allocations.
Similarly, there are economies of scale in distribution costs. A company
which accounts for 65% of all biscuit sales must have a marked advan-
tage, in terms of unit distribution costs, over companies which have only
13% or 8% of the market. All three companies distribute directly to the
retail stores but the Arnotts’ truck must be oﬀ-loading many more bis-
cuits at each stop. Again, there must be an advantage to Arnotts in
spreading the cost of a sales representative’s visit to a store amongst 65
units, as against Weston’s 13 units or Nabisco’s 8. (Arnotts appeal, at
51791–92).
If a merger enhances economic eﬃciency, that may be relevant to argu-
ment under s. 50 because the enhancements may enhance the ability of the
merged entity to survive in a competitive market. Alternatively, arguments
and evidence concerning economic eﬃciency could be introduced under
the rubric of substantiality. For example, a merger may lessen competition,
but may enhance eﬃciency. The eﬃciency considerations may be relevant
to a court’s consideration as to whether the lessening of competition is sub-
stantial.
To repeat, these arguments have not been considered by a judge in pro-
ceedings under s. 50. Until the courts consider more cases, many questions
of this kind will remain unresolved. Certainly, it is not clear whether or in
what way eﬃciency arguments can be considered by the courts under s. 50.
To the extent that there is uncertainty, the principal issues that, as a matter
of economic policy, should be considered in the antitrust treatment of
mergers may not be able to be considered by the Australian courts. The
principal issues should be whether the merger is primarily motivated by in-
creases in economic eﬃciency or by increases in monopoly power. To the
extent that s. 50 makes it likely that these issues cannot be considered, the
Australian model provides a lesson as to what other jurisdictions should
avoid.
The courts in New Zealand have had more opportunities to consider the
relevance of eﬃciency to the ways in which mergers might result in the less-
ening of competition. In an unreported case involving a strike-out appli-
cation,2 the high court (per Justice Gallen and Dr. M. Brunt) had this to
say:
In applying s. 27, counsel for Clear invites us to disregard any positive
contribution that eﬃciencies may make to the competitive process. He
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2. Clear Communications Limited v. Sky Network Television Limited and others (1996, 66–
67), High Court of New Zealand CP.19/96. Judgment of 1 August 1997.says the existence of authorisation in the New Zealand Act makes eﬃ-
ciencies relevant only in so far as they give rise to heightened barriers to
entry and hence an enhancement of market power.
We cannot accept this contention. It is contrary to a well-established
line of authority in New Zealand law that receives its latest statement
in Port Nelson Limited v Commerce Commission (1996) 7 TCLR 217 in
relation to s. 27 (at p. 228):
“The relevant inquiry is as to substantially lessening competition.
That is not the same as substantially lessening the eﬀectiveness of a
particular competitor. Competition in a market is a much broader
concept. It is deﬁned in s. 3(1) as meaning ‘workable and eﬀective
competition.’ That encompasses a market framework which partici-
pants may enter and in which they may engage in rivalrous behaviour
with the expectation of deriving advantage from greater eﬃciency.
There appears to have been consistent acceptance of the elements of
competition in Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Lim-
ited; Re Deﬁance Holdings Limited [(1976) 25 FLR 169; 8 ALR 481,
517; 1 ATPR 40-012, 17, 247] at p188; p515; p 17,246, and further quo-
tation is unnecessary.”
2.2.2 Reasons for Lack of Litigation
As was noted in the preceding section of this paper, in the ﬁrst quarter of
a century of the Trade Practices Act, only four mergers have been litigated
to judgment. Although private parties have the right to issue proceedings
for breach of s. 50, private parties cannot apply for an injunction to pre-
vent a merger from occurring. However, a company that is faced with an
unwanted oﬀer of takeover can apply for a declaration that the takeover
would infringe s. 50. Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd. (BHP) made an ap-
plication of this type when faced with the unwanted attentions of Robert
Holmes a Court’s Bell Resources Group. Similarly, QIW made an appli-
cation for a declaration of breach of s. 50 when it was faced with the un-
wanted attention of Davids Holdings, and the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission (ACCC)3 was reluctant to apply for an injunction.
However, even in this situation, QIW managed to persuade the common-
wealth attorney general to apply for an injunction to prevent the merger.
Apart from the possibility of an application for a declaration, the only
action a private party can take to obtain an injunction to prevent a merger
is to lobby the commission or the attorney general to apply for an injunc-
tion. All four mergers that have been litigated to a decision under s. 50 have
involved applications by the commission or (in the case of QIW v. Davids
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3. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission is the general antitrust regula-
tor in Australia. In addition to its roles in mergers and acquisitions, the commission has roles
in a range of antitrust matters, including anticompetitive conduct, consumer safeguards, and
the regulation of access to essential facilities.trial) by the attorney general for injunctions or orders to divest. In the cases
of AMH trial and Arnottstrial, the application had to be for divestiture be-
cause the acquisition had been already been undertaken.
Unlike some other jurisdictions, Australia does not compel parties to a
merger to notify the regulator of their intentions. In its ﬁrst three years, the
Trade Practices Act provided for the clearance of mergers. This was abol-
ished from 1 July 1977. Since then, the act has provided for two ways in
which parties contemplating a merger may deal with the commission: they
may apply for authorization (see section 2.3) or they may consummate the
merger and dare the commission to litigate. Between 1 July 1977 and the
development of the present system of informal clearances, parties had little
incentive to notify the commission of their intentions, so there was much
discussion of a system of compulsory notiﬁcation. Indeed, New Zealand
(which incorporated Australia’s antitrust provisions into its Commerce
Act pursuant to the Australia–New Zealand Closer Economic Relations
Agreement of 1983) added a compulsion to notify.
In recent times, there has been little or no discussion in Australia of com-
pulsory notiﬁcation. It appears that the commission gets to hear of all sig-
niﬁcant mergers prior to their consummation.
From ﬁgure 2.6, it is clear that, although the vast majority of matters are
referred to the commission by the parties, there is a range of other avenues,
including other regulators (such as the Federal Investment Review Board
[FIRB]), the selling of public assets (such as electricity generators), media
reports, and complaints by aﬀected parties. In a number of cases, matters
are referred to the commission by more than one source.
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Fig. 2.6 Merger and acquisition matters referred to the commission
Source: ACCC (2000, 73).From the preceding discussion, it should be clear that the Australian ex-
perience yields few lessons as to the need for a system of compulsory noti-
ﬁcation. Under the present Australian system, there is no need for com-
pulsory notiﬁcation. The regulator gains the information that it needs to
enable it to perform its task, and the parties are prepared to approach the
commission because of the development of the nonstatutory process of in-
formal clearances.
It is hardly surprising that litigation as a means of implementing an-
titrust merger policy is unpopular with the regulator and with the parties.
It is time consuming and it involves considerable uncertainty. The pro-
cesses of litigation may discourage and ultimately prevent anticompetitive
mergers and acquisitions; but they may also delay or discourage eﬃciency-
enhancing mergers and acquisitions. This is particularly the case for merg-
ers and acquisitions for which the window of opportunity is small or the
major eﬃciency beneﬁts are immediate. Litigation may deter eﬃciency-
enhancing mergers and result in economic loss in a number of diﬀerent
ways.
Delay probably constitutes the most signiﬁcant potential for economic
loss. In some mergers and acquisitions the economic synergies are of most
value in the current market environment. Delay, by reducing these eﬃcien-
cies, may destroy the economic gains from the acquisition. The window of
opportunity may pass during the process.
Even if the acquisition ultimately does proceed, the economic beneﬁts of
the acquisition may not accrue to the oﬀeror. For example, it is commonly
said that many mergers between banks are motivated by a more-eﬃcient
bank’s ability to use its systems to identify underperforming assets in other
banks. If a lengthy court process occurs prior to the consummation of the
merger, the problem of the underperforming assets may have been ad-
dressed so that the bank that identiﬁed the problem is unable to gain a re-
turn for its eﬀorts.
The cost of delaying a merger or acquisition has been recognized by the
courts. This was the subject of comment by Justice Wilcox in his decision
in AMH trial (at 49479):
It is for me a matter of concern that the crucial determination of the lim-
its of a market—about which question I assume commercial people fre-
quently make almost intuitive judgements—should be seen as requiring
the time, eﬀort and expense involved in this case. My concern is intensi-
ﬁed by the circumstances that, almost by deﬁnition, proceedings to pre-
vent a breach of sec. 50, or to reverse the eﬀects of an antecedent breach,
will always involve a measure of urgency.
The courts have made similar remarks when assessing the balance of con-
venience relevant to applications for interlocutory injunctions in merger
cases. In Santos (at 40637), Justice Hill said that a court must
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the public interest but also the private interests involved. There is, in my
view, no presumption that an interim injunction should be granted.
Similarly, in Rank Commercial, Justice Davies observed the following:
A court cannot hold the underlying commercial situation in a state of
status quo during the lengthy period in which preparation for a trial
might ordinarily be expected to take. In this period the facts, including
share values, will change.
Furthermore, delay combined with the publication of the proposed ac-
quisition may allow a competing bidder to acquire the target ﬁrm. The re-
cent proposed mergers between Taubmans and Wattyl, on the one hand,
and Santos/Sagasco, on the other, show that the delay caused by the pro-
cesses of litigation may enable a rival suitor to appear and so the proposed
acquirer may withdraw the oﬀer and sell the shares to the new suitor.
It may be argued that the delay did no harm—that the delay enabled the
appearance of a new suitor that enabled the generation of more eﬃciencies
or less monopoly power than would have been generated by the original
proposal of marriage. It may be thought that this is the explanation as to
why these mergers were not consummated. However, this characterization
may be a distortion. Litigation is expensive and the prospects of victory in
complex commercial litigation are always uncertain. An alternative char-
acterization would be that an oﬀeror enmeshed in complex litigation might
prefer to accept the certain money oﬀered by the new suitor to the prospect
of pursuing the uncertain prize of consummation of its original desires.
2.3 Authorization
2.3.1 The System
Authorization is a process by which the parties to a merger or acquisition
may be granted immunity for breaching s. 50 or s. 50A of the Trade Prac-
tices Act. This immunity is given if the commission4forms the view that the
merger or acquisition will be of net beneﬁt to the public—s. 90. In consid-
ering net beneﬁts, the commission can consider eﬃciencies. So, in contrast
to the process of a trial under s. 50, the process of authorization explicitly
allows for the consideration of eﬃciencies. Authorization is initiated by one
of the parties to the merger. It is not initiated by the commission.
An authorization decision by the commission can be appealed to the tri-
bunal.5 A review by the tribunal is a rehearing of the matter. Whereas the
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4. The ACCC was known as the Trade Practices Commission until 1995.
5. The Australian Competition Tribunal was known as the Trade Practices Tribunal until
1995.commission is an administrative body, the tribunal is a quasi-judicial body.
It is chaired by a judge of the federal court, who sits with two other mem-
bers, one of whom is usually an economist and the other, a person with
business experience.
Once a merger or acquisition has been authorized (by either the com-
mission or, on appeal, by the tribunal), parties to the merger or acquisition
are granted immunity from breaching s. 50 so long as the conditions per-
taining to the authorization are not breached.
Section 90 purports to limit the time that the commission has to deter-
mine applications for authorization. Section 90 (11) states that, if the com-
mission does not determine an application for authorization within thirty
days from its receipt, the commission shall be deemed to have granted the
application. However, s. 90 (11A) provides that this period may be ex-
tended to forty-ﬁve days if the commission notiﬁes the applicant that it
considers the matter to be complex. Furthermore, the period can be ex-
tended if the commission requires extra information, if a person (such as
an objector) wishes the commission to hold a conference, or if the appli-
cant agrees to a request by the commission to an extension of time. (It may
be supposed that an applicant who wishes an application to succeed is un-
likely to refuse such a request.)
Section 102 imposes a sixty-day limit on the tribunal in its review of de-
terminations by the commission. But this period can be extended at the dis-
cretion of the tribunal if the tribunal considers that, for reasons such as the
complexity of the matter, the matter cannot be dealt with properly within
the period of sixty days.
Applications for authorization are not only time consuming, they are
also public. In processing applications, the commission feels the need to
undertake research, and the commission’s research generally involves ask-
ing competitors, suppliers, and purchasers what they think of the proposed
merger. Furthermore, those who have been notiﬁed of the merger by the
commission may request a conference, which provides extra publicity.
As was noted in section 2.1, the future-with-and-without test was ﬁrst
articulated by the tribunal. This implies that it was ﬁrst articulated in the
context of an appeal from an authorization decision of the commission. So
in weighing the beneﬁt to the public against the detriment caused by the
lessening of competition, the tribunal (and the commission) compare the
future with and without the merger.
Like the process of litigation, the process of authorization is public and,
although there are time limits as explained above, both processes are rela-
tively time consuming. A key diﬀerence between the two processes is that
the process of authorization explicitly allows for the weighing of detriment
caused by any lessening of competition against any oﬀsetting beneﬁt to the
public.
The explicit consideration of beneﬁts to the public under the process of
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Although the commission has, on occasion, demanded that beneﬁts be
“passed on” to ﬁnal consumers if they are to be considered (see Oﬃcer and
Williams 1995) this is not because of the wording of the statute.
Indeed, in the seminal decision by the tribunal, in the merger case of
QCMA,the tribunal went out of its way to state that all beneﬁts, no matter
to whom they accrue, should be counted as beneﬁts to the public for the
purpose of consideration of an application for authorization:
One question that arises is whether by the public is meant the consum-
ing public. One submission to us was that, in the context of the objectives
of the Act, we should direct our attention to that part of the public con-
cerned with the use or consumption of ﬂour in the Queensland market.
This would be to interpret the phrase as pointing to much the same con-
siderations as those raised by sec. 21(1)(b) of the British Restrictive Prac-
tices Act1956, which asks whether withholding approval would “deny to
the public as purchasers, consumers or users . . . speciﬁc and substantial
beneﬁts or advantages . . .”. However this is not what the Australian Act
says; and we cannot but think that the choice of a wider expression was
deliberate, as pointing to some wider conception of the public interest,
though no doubt the interests of the public as purchasers, consumers or
users must fall within it and bulk large.
Another question raised is whether public beneﬁt must be contrasted
with private beneﬁt. Can a beneﬁt to some of the private parties to the
merger—for example the shareholders of Barnes—be claimed as a pub-
lic beneﬁt? . . . [W]e would not wish to rule out of consideration any ar-
gument coming within the widest possible conception of public beneﬁt.
This we see as anything of value to the community generally, any con-
tribution to the aims pursued by the society including as one of its prin-
cipal elements (in the context of trade practices legislation) the achieve-
ment of the economic goals of eﬃciency and progress. (Re QCMA, at
17242)
2.3.2 Applications for Authorization of Mergers
Given the clear mandate of the commission to consider the key issues of
both the increase in monopoly power and the eﬀects of the merger on eﬃ-
ciency following an application for authorization, one might predict that
parties would far prefer to apply for authorization than to risk litigation in
the courts. However, their revealed preferences are that they avoid appli-
cations for authorization as much as they avoid the courts. Table 2.1shows
the number of applications lodged during the last six years for authoriza-
tion of mergers and acquisitions recorded in the public register of the com-
mission.
Table 2.1 suggests that very few parties apply for authorization of merg-
ers. Given the open process and its time-consuming nature, perhaps the
real puzzle is why there are any applications at all. The explanation lies in
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jority of mergers for which applications are not made. An example may be
found in Re QIW decision. As was noted in section 2.2, immediately prior
to this application for authorization QIW was a party to s. 50 litigation,
when it successfully used the courts to thwart the unwanted advances of
Davids Holdings (QIW v. Davids). In that litigation, the courts found in fa-
vor of QIW that the product dimension of the relevant market was con-
ﬁned to the wholesaling of groceries to independent retailers—that is, that
the integrated grocery chains were not participants in the relevant market.
That ﬁnding, if it were transported to other factual situations, would eﬀec-
tively have precluded further mergers among specialist grocery whole-
salers. The authorization was an attempt by Davids to clear the way for its
acquisition of Composite Buyers Limited (CBL). Davids clearly reasoned
that, unless the acquisition was authorized, it would run the risk of a pri-
vate application for divestiture for breach of s. 50 immediately after the ac-
quisition had been consummated. The commission granted the authoriza-
tion; and this decision was upheld (in its principal elements) on appeal by
the tribunal.
An interesting feature of the merger was that Davids did not proceed to
acquire CBL. QIW was also interested in acquiring CBL. Immediately
prior to the decision of the commission, QIW increased its oﬀer for CBL
and succeeded in acquiring a controlling interest in CBL.
The delay, and the subsequent possibility of a counteroﬀer, are two re-
spects in which the process of authorization is similar to that of litigation
under s. 50. The public nature of the process is another. The delay and lack
of secrecy of these two statutory processes explain their lack of appeal to
merging parties and, one may guess, to the commission. The result has
been the development in Australia of a quick and secret process that has no
foundation in the antitrust statute. This process is generally known as the
process of informal clearance.
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Table 2.1 Applications for Authorizations of Acquisitions Registered with
the Commission







2001 (to date) 0
Source:Public Register of Applications for Authorisation, Australian Competition, and Con-
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Fig. 2.7 Re QIW
2.4 Informal Clearances
2.4.1 The Process
The costs and risks associated with the statutory processes combined
with the powers of the commission to seek an injunction to prevent a
merger or acquisition have seen an informal notiﬁcation and clearance
process develop in Australia. The informal notiﬁcation and clearance pro-cess is not based in the statute. Although the commission has published
Merger Guidelines,which inform parties of the informal process, the guide-
lines have no statutory basis. As a result, the commission has signiﬁcant
discretion in how it goes about assessing proposed mergers and acquisi-
tions and the conditions it endeavours to impose on the acquirer. The in-




As was noted in section 2.1 above, parties to a proposed merger or ac-
quisition are not obligated under the Trade Practices Act to notify the com-
mission of their proposal. However, many do. As shown in ﬁgure 2.1, well
in excess of half of the mergers and acquisitions notiﬁed to the commission
over the last two years have been notiﬁed by the parties. This is done on ei-
ther a public or a conﬁdential basis.
The reason parties notify the commission is to gain some comfort as to
whether the commission will seek an injunction if they proceed with the ac-
quisition. If the commission indicates it will seek an injunction if the ac-
quisition proceeds, the notiﬁcation process allows the party or parties to
explore with the commission options for changing the proposed acquisi-
tion to address the competition concerns. This process enables the com-
mission to make the parties aware of its view of an acquisition and merger
before the matter reaches the court.
The informal process by which the commission assesses merger and ac-
quisitions is described in its Merger Guidelines. The process aims to con-
sider the matters a court would consider under s. 50.
A major issue aﬀecting the process and how the commission conducts its
investigation is whether the merger or acquisition is notiﬁed to the com-
mission on a conﬁdential basis. Maintaining conﬁdentiality restricts the
commission’s ability to seek the views of, and to acquire information from,
other parties such as competitor suppliers and buyers—that is, the conﬁ-
dentiality limits the commission’s opportunity to conduct market inquiries.
In some cases this may not matter. For example, the commission has in-
dicated that it will not oppose mergers and acquisitions that fall below a
certain concentration threshold. As noted by the commission in its Merger
Guidelines (ACCC 1999, 44):
The Commission has adopted concentration thresholds below which it
is unlikely to intervene in a proposed merger. The thresholds have been
established on the basis of the Commission’s historical experience of
mergers and knowledge of current market structures....  
If the merger will result in a post-merger combined market share of the
four (or fewer) largest ﬁrms (CR4) of 75 per cent or more and the merged
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sion will want to give further consideration to a merger proposal before
being satisﬁed that it will not result in a substantial lessening of compe-
tition. In any event, if the merged ﬁrm will supply 40 per cent or more of
the market, the Commission will want to give the merger further con-
sideration. The two thresholds reﬂect concerns with the potential exer-
cise of both coordinated market power and unilateral market power.
Below these thresholds, the Commission is unlikely to take any further
interest in a merger.
In other cases, especially where the likely eﬀects of a merger or acquisi-
tion are complex, the commission’s market inquiries may be extremely im-
portant. As a result, the commission may not be able to form a ﬁnal view
on the matter until the proposal has been made public.
In the case of the merger proposed between Santos and Sagasco, the
commission granted an informal clearance and then changed its mind. The
behavior of the commission is readily explained: If, for reasons of secrecy,
they are unable to make any inquiries other than of the parties, the infor-
mation they may be relying on may be biased, partial, or even misleading.
In such circumstances, it is clear that the commission must be able to
change its mind when it is able to make open inquiries.
The criteria employed in the process of informal clearance, while set out
in detail in the Merger Guidelines, are based on the commission’s own inter-
pretation of s. 50. The process of informal clearance refers to s. 50 in that, if
the applicant is given an informal clearance, it is given an assurance that, on
the basis of the information available to it, the commission will not issue pro-
ceedings for breach of s. 50 should the proposed merger proceed. Accord-
ingly, the commission must satisfy itself that the merger will not breach s. 50.
One important feature of the commission’s interpretation of s. 50 in its
processing of informal clearances is the very limited role it allows for con-
sideration of economic eﬃciency. As was noted in section 2.1 above, the
place of eﬃciency arguments under s. 50 has never been explicitly consid-
ered by the courts—because it has not arisen in any of the four cases that
have run to judgment.
The extent to which the commission is prepared to consider economic
eﬃciency within the context of an informal application for clearance is set
out in paragraphs 5.159 and following of the commission’s Merger Guide-
lines. There is a marked similarity between these provisions and those of
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by the U.S. Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission. The ACCC (1999, 59–60) guidelines
read, in part:
5.171 As discussed in paragraphs 5.16–5.17, although s. 50 is con-
cerned with the level of competition in markets and not the competi-
tiveness of individual ﬁrms, and while eﬃciencies are more generally rel-
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enhancing aspects of a merger may impact on the competitiveness of
markets is relevant in the context of s. 50.
5.172 Where a merger enhances the eﬃciency of the merged ﬁrm, for
example by achieving economies of scale or eﬀectively combining re-
search and development facilities, it may have the eﬀect of creating a new
or enhanced competitive constraint on the unilateral conduct of other
ﬁrms in the market or it may undermine the conditions for coordinated
conduct. Pecuniary beneﬁts, such as lower input prices due to enhanced
bargaining power, may also be relevant in a s. 50 context.
5.173 If eﬃciencies are likely to result in lower (or not signiﬁcantly
higher) prices, increased output and/or higher quality goods or services,
the merger may not substantially lessen competition.
5.174 While recognising that precise quantiﬁcation of such eﬃciencies
is not generally possible, the Commission will require strong and cred-
ible evidence that such eﬃciencies are likely to accrue and that the
claimed beneﬁts for competition are likely to follow.
Paragraph 5.172 indicates that the role of any consideration of economic
eﬃciency within the context of an application for an informal clearance is
highly circumscribed. In particular, if a ﬁrm with a large market share be-
lieves that it can gain access to eﬃciencies through merger, that considera-
tion will be ruled by the commission to be irrelevant to an application for
informal clearance. Indeed, the commission may well follow the lead of the
full federal court in Arnottsappeal, as quoted above, and say that to the ex-
tent that a merger enhances the eﬃciency of a ﬁrm with a large market
share, it is likely to lessen competition.
This interpretation by the commission means that the commission elects
to rule as irrelevant many arguments of economic eﬃciency in the context
of applications for informal clearance. The commission will normally re-
spond to such arguments by informing the parties that, if they wish to put
such arguments, they must submit an application for authorization—with
its attendant delays and publicity. This response is usually suﬃcient to per-
suade the parties to drop the submissions.
It is clearly unsatisfactory that issues of economic eﬃciency cannot be
fully considered under the procedure by which the mergers are dealt with
by the Australian antitrust authority. This problem could be remedied if s.
50 were to be amended to invite the courts and, therefore, the commission
in its processing of applications for clearance, to consider the trade-oﬀs be-
tween considerations of competition and eﬃciency. Such a change would
enable the eﬃciency implications of a merger to be considered. Under the
present Australian arrangements they are only considered very rarely be-
cause the statutory option of an application for authorization is no real op-
tion for the great bulk of mergers.
One model as to how the Australian statute could be changed is provided
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found in s. 92(1), which proscribes mergers that prevent or lessen competi-
tion substantially. This is qualiﬁed by s. 96(1), which provides an eﬃciency
defence. It is worth quoting in full (in its English version):
The Tribunal shall not make an order under section 92 if it ﬁnds that the
merger or proposed merger in respect of which the application is made
has brought about or is likely to bring about gains in eﬃciency that will
be greater than, and will oﬀset, the eﬀects of any prevention or lessening
of competition that will result or is likely to result from the merger or
proposed merger and that the gains in eﬃciency would not be likely be
attained if the order were made.
From 1991 until very recently, the Merger Enforcement Guidelines of the
Canadian commissioner had indicated that the eﬀects of an anticompeti-
tive merger were to be assessed by estimating the aggregate eﬀect of the
merger on social surplus. A recent decision on appeal from a decision of
the tribunal (Superior Propane) makes it clear that this approach was an
incorrect interpretation of the law. Under the previous approach of the
commission, it had focused solely on aggregate surplus and had ignored
other factors, such as the distribution of the surplus. The court found that
the correct approach is not to disregard any of the eﬀects of the lessening
of competition that would be likely to result from a merger.
Although some may consider this judgment a setback for the cause of
economic eﬃciency, the decision in Superior Propane merely brings the
Canadian standard into line with the standard applied by the Australian
tribunal in merger cases. As the tribunal has said since the earliest of cases,
the public interest is suﬃciently broad to enable all considerations to be ar-
gued before the tribunal. In eﬀect, the decision in Superior Propane estab-
lishes that Canada has a statutory standard that is very similar to that
which would be applied by the tribunal in its consideration of the authori-
zation of a merger—if such a case were to come to it for consideration. If
the statute is to reﬂect a proper weighing of competition and eﬃciency con-
siderations, the same standard should be incorporated in s. 50.
2.4.2 Outcomes of an Informal Clearance
The commission has a number of options after it has assessed a proposed
merger. It can
• indicate that it will not oppose the merger or acquisition,
• indicate that it will oppose the merger or acquisition unless the or par-
ties agree to certain conditions or to act in a certain manner, or
• indicate it will oppose the merger or acquisition under any conditions.
As shown in table 2.2, the majority of matters that reach a ﬁnal decision
by the commission are not opposed. A range of other proposals are with-
drawn before the commission reaches its ﬁnal view.
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conditions on a number of mergers. These are the circumstances in which
eﬃciency-enhancing acquisitions are most likely to be inhibited. The com-
mission has signiﬁcant bargaining power to “encourage” the party or par-
ties to signiﬁcantly alter the form of the proposal or to impose conditions
on the parties if the proposal proceeds.
If the commission indicates that it is likely to seek an injunction from the
courts if the proposal proceeded in its submitted form, the parties have a
number of options:
1. Proceed with the proposal and most likely contest the matter or an in-
junction before the Court.
2. Seek authorization of the proposed merger or acquisition from the
commission, and if rejected, appeal to the tribunal.
3. Alter the proposal in a manner to address the concerns of the com-
mission.
4. Address any anticompetitive consequences of the merger or acquisi-
tion by making undertakings under s. 87B of the Trade Practices Act.
5. Decide not to proceed with the proposal.
The ﬁrst and second options follow the statutory processes described in
the previous sections of this chapter. The third and fourth options are in-
formal processes that give the commission signiﬁcant discretion. The ma-
jor diﬀerence between these options is whether the altered proposal is sub-
ject to legally enforceable undertakings.
2.4.3 Section 87B Undertakings
Under s. 87B of the Trade Practices Act, the commission, subject to the
approval of the courts, is allowed to accept written undertakings in con-
nection with its power and functions under the act. Undertakings are
legally enforceable guarantees that the parties will or will not undertake
certain actions following the merger or acquisition.
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Table 2.2 Outcomes of Mergers before the Commission
Matters Matters Matters Resolved Matters
Decided Not Opposed with Conditions Opposed
1993–1994 77 71 1 5
1994–1995 113 101 5 7
1995–1996 117 105 3 9
1996–1997 147 140 2 5
1997–1998 176 165 6 5
1998–1999 185 168 10 7
1999–2000 208 199 5 4
Sources: ACCC (2000) and Section 50 Mergers and Acquisitions Register, Australian Com-
petition and Consumer Commission Web site (www.accc.gov.au, http://accc.gov.au).For instance, say the commission is concerned that a merger will sub-
stantially lessen competition in some geographic markets, but not others.
The commission may accept undertakings by the merged entity to divest it-
self (postmerger) of certain assets in those markets.
Undertakings also provide the parties with some ﬂexibility where the
timeliness of the merger or acquisitions is paramount. Undertakings have
been used by parties to guarantee divestiture if the commission forms the
view that the merger or acquisition would substantially lessen competition.
In this case, undertakings have allowed the transaction to proceed while
giving the commission time to assess the transaction.
Probably the most detailed undertakings to be given by parties during a
merger application to the commission were those given to the commission
by Pioneer International Limited, Caltex Australia Limited, and Ampol
Limited on 28 March 1995. On 3 November 1994, the parties informed the
commission that they were considering a merger. This was announced to
the public on 14 December 1994. The commission quickly formed the view
that the merger was likely to infringe s. 50. The parties disagreed. Never-
theless, they gave numerous undertakings to address the concerns raised by
the commission. These undertakings were clearly directed to ensure that
independent oil companies prospered. The merged entity undertook
• to sell particular terminals to independents by particular dates;
• to facilitate access by independents to the terminals that were re-
tained;
• during the ﬁrst six years, to oﬀer at least 1,000 megaliters of petrol to
independents each year on reasonable terms;
• during the ﬁrst two years, to use its best endeavors to sell on reason-
able terms thirty-ﬁve retail sites in metropolitan areas with an aggre-
gate volume of 50 megaliters; and so on.
In short, Caltex and Ampol felt that they could prevent the commission
from initiating proceedings under s. 50 only by oﬀering to sell quite sub-
stantial assets by which the commission could pursue a restructuring of
Australia’s wholesaling and retailing of petrol. The commission has sub-
stantial power in its granting of informal clearances.
2.4.4 Shortcomings of the Informal Process
Although this informal process has the scope to reduce some of the de-
lay and publicity associated with a proposed merger, it has three major
problems.
First, the informal processes are not based in the statute. Although the
commission’s Merger Guidelinesinform parties of the informal process, the
guidelines have no statutory basis. This creates uncertainty: There are no
rules governing the processes that the commission can use following an ap-
plication for an informal clearance.
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the commission does not publish the reasons for its decision, there are no
formal precedents to guide future decisions and to subject the decisions to
peer review. This lack of precedent is another factor that increases the dis-
cretion that is exercised by the commission in any particular case. The
corollary is that the uncertainty confronting the parties to a merger is in-
creased.
Finally, it provides the commission with signiﬁcant bargaining power to
extract concession from the parties. These problems create a risk that eﬃ-
ciency-enhancing mergers will be unnecessarily altered or deterred. Noah
(1997) characterises this behavior as “administrative arm-twisting.”6
It might be thought that the need for conﬁdentiality and for speed mean
that the process cannot be combined with review processes. This is not the
case—providing the commission gives reasons for its decisions and any re-
views occur after the merger has been announced. This could be provided
for in legislation. Any review on the merits would clearly be problematic if
the commission has been unable to gather information. However, if the
process were governed by statute, parties would be able to appeal if the
commission violated the requirements of the statute.
The number of matters dealt with in table 2.3 points to the popularity of
the process of informal clearance compared with authorization or litiga-
tion. It also points to the speed of the process compared with the processes
set out in the statute.
2.5 Lessons from the Australian Experience
Lessons can be drawn from the Australian experience both for how Aus-
tralia should reform its own statute and procedures, and for other jurisdic-
tions that may be reconsidering their own commitment to antitrust merger
policy if those countries wish to maximize value.
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6. Noah (1997, 874) deﬁnes administrative arm-twisting as “a threat by an agency to im-
pose a sanction or withhold a beneﬁt in hopes of encouraging ‘voluntary’ compliance with a
request that the agency could not impose directly on a regulated entity.” We are indebted to
Robertson (2001) for this reference.
Table 2.3 Duration of Matters Informally Assessed by the Commission
1997–1998 1998–1999
Less than 2 weeks 36 48
2–3 weeks 57 56
4–6 weeks 22 41
7–9 weeks 3 11
More than 9 weeks 18 22
Source: ACCC (2000, 70).The key lessons from the Australian experience that might be drawn for
other jurisdictions that wished to maximize value are the following:
1. The criteria for assessing mergers must explicitly provide for an as-
sessment as to whether the merger is primarily motivated by an increase in
monopoly power or an increase in economic eﬃciency.
2. The process must be quick and must allow for secrecy (up the point
that the merger is made public by one of the parties).
If the Australian legislature wished to maximize value, it should
1. give the present clearance process a statutory basis, so that parties
can go to the commission with the knowledge that there are some con-
straints on what it may do;
2. legislate by amending to provide that the commission weighs up mo-
nopoly and eﬃciency considerations in considering whether it should
grant a clearance; and
3. require the commission to publish its reasons as soon as the merger
is public.
If applied in less developed countries, these principles will increase the
prospect that the regulator will allow value-enhancing mergers. Further-
more, by increasing the transparency of the decisions of the regulator, they
will minimize the scope for mergers or acquisitions motivated by rent seek-
ing and improve certainty in the regulatory processes.
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66 Philip L. Williams and Graeme WoodbridgeComment Charles W. Calomiris
The paper by Williams and Woodbridge provides a useful review of anti-
trust law as it is practiced in Australia. The authors begin by positing two
criteria that are necessary “if antitrust merger policy is to enhance value.”
First, mergers that promote eﬃciency must be permitted and those that
promote monopoly power disallowed. Second, the merger approval pro-
cess should be speedy and conﬁdential. They then hold up the experience
of Australia to the mirror of their two-part objective function. They ﬁnd
Australian practice wanting in important respects and propose some mod-
iﬁcations that they believe would improve regulatory performance.
It is hard to ﬁnd fault with the twin objectives the authors propose, ex-
cept in the incompleteness of the list of objectives, and in the failure to fully
consider ways in which broad diﬀerences in approach to regulation might
aﬀect the likelihood of meeting either the objectives they propose or others
that might be added to their list. In my comments, I will add a third crite-
rion to the Williams-Woodbridge list—a criterion that is already implicit
in their discussion of the ﬂaws of the current system—and propose changes
in regulatory process that would likely improve performance according to
all three criteria. Speciﬁcally, I will argue that an approach to antitrust reg-
ulation that relies more on speciﬁc rules deﬁning the criteria for permissi-
ble mergers, and that provides prospective merger counterparties with
clear safe harbors from regulators’ blocking mergers, would improve regu-
latory performance in comparison with the current approach, which relies
almost entirely on discretionary, case-by-case judgments in the form of
“informal notiﬁcations and clearances.”
The objective I would add to the Williams-Woodbridge list for measur-
ing regulatory performance is avoiding “stealth regulation.” Stealth regu-
lation refers to the practice of using antitrust authority as an extortionist
device for coercing ﬁrms to do things that they are not legally required to
do, but that the bureaucrat entrusted with regulating them wishes them to
do. Stealth regulation is a serious problem in the United States, especially
in the regulation of telecommunications and banking.1 In telecommunica-
tions and banking, permission for acquisitions are withheld on ﬂimsy legal
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1. “Separate Statement of Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth Concurring in Part,
Dissenting in Part” Re: Applications of Ameritech Corp., Transferor, and SBC Communica-
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sion Licenses and Lines Pursuant to Sections 214 and 310(d) of the Communications Act and
Parts 5, 22, 24, 25, 63, 90, 95, and 101 of the Commission’s Rules, CC Docket 98-141.grounds, including alleged antitrust concerns, until ﬁrms “voluntarily” of-
fer to institute new policies, which are touted as providing some program al-
leged to beneﬁt the “community.” Given the legal costs and time lost in ﬁght-
ing the regulators, ﬁrms often give in to this extortion, which, of course,
encourages it. In some cases, regulatory extortion serves the political goals
of ambitious bureaucrats; in other cases, it has a corrupt purpose, as
money is channeled to favored recipients. Whatever its purpose, stealth
regulation is a highly inappropriate use of regulatory discretion. I do not
know the extent to which this problem is present in Australia, and the evi-
dence in table 2.2 on the use of conditions in the merger approval process
suggests that stealth regulation is less a problem in Australia than in the
United States (at least so far). But, assuming that the dictum “power cor-
rupts” applies around the globe, it should also be a policy concern there.
Williams and Woodbridge seem to agree that this has been a problem in
Australia, when they write that “Australia’s reliance on discretion over
rules” has granted the antitrust regulator “an unhealthy degree of power to
extract concessions from the enterprises that wish to merge.” That is the
sense in which their discussion implicitly recognizes the need to avoid reg-
ulatory abuse; but they should elevate this concern to the status of an im-
portant and explicit goal for the regulatory process.
Let me turn to the question of how the extent of regulatory discretion
aﬀects regulatory performance according to all three criteria. First, as the
authors note, the legal standard used to judge whether a merger is appro-
priate is quite vague—whether competition in the relevant market would be
worsened by the merger, based on the “future-with-and-without test.” That
vagueness, and the desire to preserve conﬁdentiality during the merger ap-
proval process, has encouraged the reliance on informal, secret regulatory
deliberations to decide whether to permit or to challenge a merger. But as
the authors recognize, this informality (especially when combined with the
admitted necessity of secrecy) invites ineﬀective and abusive policy, and it
may not be suﬃciently speedy in reaching a result. That is, there is no rea-
son to believe that the eﬃciency criterion is being satisﬁed or that the pro-
cess is suﬃciently speedy, and there is great opportunity for abuse.
How could speed and conﬁdentiality be preserved while also ensuring
greater eﬀectiveness and less abuse? Williams and Woodbridge suggest that
the answer is to mandate that regulators weigh eﬃciency and monopoly
when deciding whether to approve a merger. No doubt the authors are
right to argue that it is appropriate to weigh eﬃciency gains against lessen-
ing of competition. But, as a recipe for reform, this is a thin gruel. Their
proposed criterion is still extremely vague. And it accomplishes little in the
way of making the merger approval process predictable to prospective
counterparties, which Williams and Woodbridge rightly emphasize as de-
sirable. I see no reason to believe that this new mandate will add rational-
ity or predictability to the process, hasten regulatory action, or avoid
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gon used by bureaucrats to explain their protracted, results-oriented, dis-
cretionary decisions. Requiring that the Australian Competition and Con-
sumer Commission publish its reasoning sounds like a good idea, but
published opinions are not necessarily clear or defensible ones.
Ideally, to make antitrust adjudication more eﬀective, speedy, and pre-
dictable, one would bind the commission’s decisions so that they were
derived in predictable ways from observable criteria. Furthermore, one
would put in place ﬁrm time deadlines for ﬁrst- and second-stage decisions
by the commission (i.e., ﬁrst, with respect to the decision to hear a merger
case, and second, regarding the time before a decision must be reached).
The ideal rules-based approach would have two parts. First, it would es-
tablish safe harbor rules. A good starting place would be to oﬀer safe har-
bor to all mergers unless they are challenged by a third party. Challenged
mergers should also enjoy safe harbor if, according to some prespeciﬁed
set of objective, quantiﬁable criteria, a merger does not violate a given
threshold of anticompetitiveness. Mergers enjoying safe harbor would be
protected from regulatory risk by being automatically approved. For ﬁrms
that fail the automatic approval test, the commission’s deliberations should
also be transparent, predictable, based on objective preannounced criteria,
and subject to hard time limits.
With respect to safe harbor, the concentration ratio could serve as a pos-
sible criterion. Any mergers that would result in small industrial concen-
tration or little price impact would not be subject to further review by the
commission. Enforcing even this simple ﬁrst-stage rule would require that
the commission explicitly deﬁne the industry for which the calculation is
relevant. This is tricky, but it could be handled in various ways. One possi-
bility would be assigning all ﬁrms, ex ante, to an industry, so that the com-
bination resulting from any proposed merger would have a predeﬁned
eﬀect on the concentration in one or more industries. Another possibility
would be allowing the commission to deﬁne the relevant industry concept
ex post, but require that this deﬁnition be defensible on objective grounds.2
Whatever the safe harbor rule chosen, it is essential that it be observable
and known to all participants ex ante. I rely on concentration ratios in my
example of a proposed safe harbor rule not because they are precise mea-
sures of market power but because a minimal degree of market concentra-
tion is a necessary condition for market power, and because they are rela-
tively easy to deﬁne. Of course, even this simple approach to a safe harbor
rule must admit some discretion, if only because statistical data and econo-
metric estimation will always permit some manipulation. Nevertheless,
this approach would be a huge step in the right direction.
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2. For example, if the ﬁrms placed in the industry concept do not exhibit suﬃciently posi-
tive cross-price elasticities, the deﬁnition would not be deemed acceptable.For ﬁrms that do not receive automatic safe harbor, a second, more com-
plicated set of rules would apply to the process for considering the merger.
It would be useful here to vary the burden of proof according to prima fa-
cie evidence about some criteria. For example, for ﬁrms that have concen-
tration ratios only slightly above the safe harbor maximum, the burden of
proof would be on the commission, and the criteria that would have to be
satisﬁed to bar the merger would be relatively demanding. The commission
would have a speciﬁc evidentiary burden. The criteria for the decision
would, as before, be prespeciﬁed and quantitative. For mergers that would
result in substantial industrial concentration, the burden of proof would
shift to the ﬁrms, in the sense that the criteria necessary for denying the
merger would be less demanding. As before, the rules would be prespeci-
ﬁed, including rules that determine the means of weighing the estimated
monopoly costs and eﬃciency gains from the merger. With such rules in
place, the job of the commission largely would be (1) to reﬁne the rules over
time, and (2) to ensure that the rules are executed properly. Discretion on
a case-by-case basis would be kept to a minimum.
Of course, some discretion would remain no matter how one tried to
limit it. But if the commission were subject to speciﬁc evidentiary burdens,
and were required to prespecify detailed empirical criteria for denying
mergers, the opportunities for delay and abuse would be substantially re-
duced. Furthermore, being forced to adopt speciﬁc criteria and to an-
nounce objective functions that weigh the estimated eﬀects of the merger
on eﬃciency and monopoly power, improves the likelihood that the deci-
sions will do a better job balancing opposing considerations.
None of this would be easy to implement. Besides the tricky technical is-
sues of deciding on reasonable criteria and weights to attach to them, there
is an even bigger impediment to this sort of reform. Politicians tend not to
like proposals like this, partly because such folk tend to overvalue the ben-
eﬁts of discretion and undervalue the beneﬁts of predictable rules and con-
straints on the abuse of power. For Australia, the United States, and other
countries to arrive at this sort of rational process it may be necessary for
power to be placed more in the hands of people who think like economists.
We can all look forward to that distant happy day.
Comment Chong-Hyun Nam
This paper is very informative and is useful for policymakers both in Aus-
tralia and in many other countries. The paper addresses at the outset a sort
of ideal set of criteria under which antitrust merger policies should be
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Chong-Hyun Nam is professor of economics at Korea University.formed and operated. In brief, it states that antitrust merger policies
should be designed in such a way as to allow those mergers and acquisi-
tions (M&As) that promote economic eﬃciency while discouraging those
M&As that promote monopoly power. At the same time, it says that the
process of assessing M&As needs to be conducted in a speedy and conﬁ-
dential manner so that social costs involved with the M&As can be mini-
mized. In light of these criteria, the paper then makes a very careful review
of Australian antitrust laws and their applications in practice for recent
years.
To summarize the highlights of the paper: The most important ﬁnding
is that the antitrust laws, as set out in s. 50 of the Trade Practice Act, are
grossly inadequate to deal with mergers because they make no explicit ref-
erence to economic eﬃciency. The paper also ﬁnds that the authorization
process seems a little bit better than the litigation process based on s. 50,
since it allows the commission to make decisions based on net economic
beneﬁts, which means that economic eﬃciency can be taken into consider-
ation in the decision-making process.
Both litigation and authorizing processes, the two statutory processes,
suﬀer, however, from delay and lack of secrecy, and therefore have been
least popular among parties to the mergers. As a natural consequence, par-
ties to the mergers relied heavily on a more quick and secret process,
namely, the informal clearance process. As was already discussed by the
authors, the informal clearance process has no foundation in the antitrust
statute, and hence cannot be used as a precedent: the reasons for its deci-
sion cannot be made public. Moreover, there is a danger that the commis-
sion may exercise too much discretionary or bargaining power to extract
concessions from parties to the mergers.
In the end, the paper suggests three major reform agendas for possible
legislation. They are as follows: (1) give the present informal clearance pro-
cess a statutory basis; (2) require the commission to access potential eﬃ-
ciency gains from the mergers, and use them in weighing trade-oﬀs be-
tween eﬃciency gains and monopoly-power increases when considering
whether to grant a clearance; and (3) require the commission to publish its
reasons for decision as soon as the merger becomes public. Among these
three points, I have no disagreement with the ﬁrst and the third, but I have
some reservations about the second.
I think it is too tall an order—if not an impossible task—for the com-
mission to measure economic eﬃciency gains from the mergers. It will be
not only time consuming but also inaccurate, at best. Further, I am not sure
if it is necessary for the commission to assess the eﬃciency gains in order
to be able to make the right decision when granting a clearance. What I
have in mind is that most of the merger cases are likely to be eﬃciency en-
hancing. Otherwise, they would not have been tried in the ﬁrst place.
However, the economic eﬃciency gains should by no means be used as
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nopoly power. In other words, the negative eﬀects originating from in-
creased monopoly power should be prevented in any circumstance, re-
gardless of the magnitude of expected eﬃciency gains from the mergers.
From the social welfare point of view, the negative eﬀects of increased mo-
nopoly power can best be assessed in terms of price changes of the con-
cerned products, not by changes in the number of ﬁrms or by changes in
their market shares. As long as prices of concerned products remain un-
changed, or are lower than before the mergers take place, there is no rea-
son for the commission not to grant a clearance.
Therefore, I think, the commission’s eﬀort needs to be focused on the
price eﬀects of the mergers, and that should be used as a major criterion
when considering whether to give a clearance. If we accept this simple prin-
ciple, the antitrust merger rules and the commission’s duty can be made a
lot simpler than they are now. For example, the commission does not need
to intervene at all in private M&A activities as long as international com-
petition is guaranteed for the concerned products, which are tradable
goods in nature. Parties to the mergers do not even need to notify the com-
mission under these kinds of circumstances. However, the commission
needs to intervene in private M&A activities when the concerned products
are characterized by nontradable goods, or when natural or artiﬁcial trade
barriers are so high that eﬀective competition cannot be guaranteed simply
by exposing them to international competition only. Even in this case, the
commission’s burden can be reduced substantially if the commission
makes use of price-undertakings whenever it seems appropriate. When
granting a clearance, the commission needs to make sure that domestic
prices of the concerned products do not rise as a result of M&As. In any
event, making rules and regulations simpler and clearer is a job best left for
economists, not for lawyers.
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